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1. Introduction.
Most analyses of the  debt crisis of the  1980s maintain that  debtor countries were
paying interest rates approximately equal to the world risk-free interest rate plus a small
spread, as most loans were at floating interest rates  (see for instance M. Feldstein et al.,
1987, or J.  Sachs, 1989).  This view emphasizes how the rise in real interest rates in the
early  '808 increased the  burden of debt service for all  highly indebted  countries (HICs).
The data  on interest  payments  by  HICs, however, show that  this  description fits  some
countries quite  well and others  not at  all.  Figure 1 shows the  average interest  rate  on
long-term  debt paid by nine of the  largest debtor countries in  1973-89 and LIBOR, the
usual measure of the international  risk-free interest rate.  The data are obtained dividing
interest  payments by  the  stock of debt  outstanding,  and correcting for interest  arrears,
hence they  reflect all  contractual  obligations towards external  long-term  creditors,  as
opposed to actual payments'.  Turkey, Indonesia, and the Philippines were charged rates
systematically  below  LIBOR  for most  of  the  period  under  consideration, while other
countries, such as Mexdco  and Chile, had to pay a positive spread 2.
Differences  in the interest rate, of course, imply that  countries with similar inflows
of  foreign  capital  end  up  with  quite  different  debt  service  obligations,  and  that
high-interest  rate  countries  must  make larger  transfers  of resources to  their  creditors
before their  debt  statistics  start  to  improve.  Hence, a large cross-country  variation in
interest rates  casts some doubts  on the  distinction  between 'good' and  'bad'  borrowers,
'The Turldsh interest rate in 1979-80 is not corrected for arrears, as the size of the arrears
could not be determined.
21t  should be noted that  large cross-country  differences  would remain even if we looked at
actual interest rates,  as interest  arrears were neither widespread nor large in the sample
(see section 2 below).2
based on whether a country needs ex-post  debt relief or not:  If 'good' debtors are paying
below-market interest rates to  start with, the fact that  they do not default does not make
them a profitable investment  for their  creditors, nor does it  necessarily imply that  they
have followed wiser macroeconomic  policies.  Some studies  (see J.  Sachs et al.,  1989) have
sought to  explain differences in  rescheduling behavior across HICs in  terms  of different
policy responses to external  and internal  shocks.  Figure 1 suggests that  these countries
faced interest rate  shocks of a very different magnitude, and that  these differences  should
be taken into account in eNaluating responses to the  crisis.  Also, the issue arises of why
some creditor countries were able to pay rates systematically below the cost of funds for
their lenders.
The purpose of this  paper  is both  to  document and  to  try  to  explain this  large
cross-country  variation in interest  rates.  So far, a  number of studies  (G.  Feder and  R.
Just,  1977, S. Edwards, 1984, S. Ozler, forthcomiing,  H. Huizinga, 1991) have investigated
the determinants of spreads on individual loans to HICs.  The purpose of these studies was
not  to  assess the  burden  of debt  service for different HICs, but  rather  to  test  whether
market interest rates reflected the creditworthiness of the borrower.  Hence, the spread on
floating-rate  loans from private creditors is used as the dependent variable, and a number
of variables related to a country's ability and willingness to repay foreign creditors are the
regressors 3. Less creditworthy countries had to pay larger spreads on their external debt.
Differences  in the  default-risk  spread, however, are not the only element that  can
generate differences in  the contractual burden of debt service.  Variation in  the  share of
fixed-interest  rate  debt, in the  share of official debt, and in the currency composition of
debt may also matter  (Tables 1 and 2).  If official loans include an implicit grant element,
30zler (forthcoming) also shows that previous credit-market  experience plays a role in the
formation of the spread.3
more access to  this  type  of  credit  obviously means  a  smaller  burden  of  debt  service.
Different shares  of  floating-rate  debt  in  the  total  can  also  potentially  provide  an
explanation of cross-country  variation in interest rates.  For instance, if the interest rate
shock of the  early  '80s was largely unexpected, countries with  more debt  at fixed-rates
would have benefited at the expense of their creditors.  Finally, differences in the currency
composition of debt  may  also play  a  role.  Countries more indebted  in  high-inflation
currencies would tend to  pay higher nominal interest  rates.  Such rates,  however, simply
compensate creditors for the depreciation of the principal, and do not constitute a higher
burden of debt service.
To investigate the deterninants  of average interest rates we use a sample of pooled
cross-section  and  time-series  data  for nine large  HICs.  We  estimate  a  model of the
average spread  over  LIBOR  that  allows us  not  only  to  assess the  impact  of various
creditworthiness indicators,  but  also to  test  whether official debt  involved a  significant
grant  element, and whether fixed-rate  debt  has been cheaper than floating-rate  debt in
the period under consideration.  Since data on currency composition are available only for
the  period  1981-89,  we present  results  for  the  whole sample  without  correcting  for
differences  in currency composition, and then we study the effects  of taking such differences
into account for the shorter subperiod 1981-89.
We  find  that  official  debt  involved  a  substantial  subsidy,  and  the  observed
cross-country differences  in the share of official debt can account for differcnces  in interest
rates of the order of 3-4 percentage points.  So differential treatment  by official creditors
has played an important  role in determining the burden of debt service.  These results have
implications for judging  the  fairness of  recent  debt  relief initiatives:  Official creditors
provided considerable implicit subsidies in the form of loans at below-market interest rates
to the  Asian countries in  our sample, while Latin American countries did not  benefit as4
much from this type of aid.  The resources recently provided by multilateral  and bilateral
lenders to reward and support  economic stabilization in  countries like Mexico are  having
the indirect effect of correcting the initial imbalance.
The estimation also indicates that  debt at  fixed-rates  and  debt at  floating-rates
have been equally expensive on average.  Hence, countries with a lot of debt at fixed rates,
although they were able to avoid the surge in LIBOR in the early '80s, were penalized in
other periods.  It  may still  be the  case that  floating-rate  loans hurt  borrowers if they
forced them to make higher interest payments in pe,iods in  which it was especially costly
do so (E. Detragiache, 1992). Further research is needed tQ address this issue.
Finally,  controlling for differences in  the  currency composition of debt  does not
substantially  alter  the  results  discussed above.  There is some evidence that  the  grant
element associated with official debt is sensitive to the currency of denomination, and that
fixed-rate  debt denominated in strong currencies (yen, fl-mark  and Swiss franc) was more
expensive than floating-rate  debt.
To sum up, this study shows that  attempts  to evaluate the economic performance of
HiCs during the  period of the debt crisis, and, in particular,  to assess the effectiveness of
different policy responses to the external shocks of the early '80s, should take into account
that  countries had a different burden of interest payments, due to the different structure of
their foreign debt.  Failure to do so may lead to overemphasize  policy differences.
The paper is organized as follows: In the first section, the data is described in some
detail.  Then a simple model of the interest rate is presented, and an empirical specification
is derived.  A brief discussion of estimation techniques, and the results of the estimation
are in Section 4.  Then model is extended to allow for a different currency composition, and
empirical results are presented for the subperiod 1981-89.  The conclusions summarize the
results.5
2. A First  Look  at the Data.
The  sample  consists  of  nine  large  and  middle-size  countries,  all  of  which
experienced high levels of indebtedness sometimes during 1973-88.  All countries, with the
notable exception of South Korea and  Indonesia, had  to  reschedule their  debt.  Turkey
rescheduled in  the  late  seventies, while all the  remaining countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  Mexico, the  Philippines,  and  Venezuela) experienced debt  restructuring  in  the
mid-eighties.  Finally, all countries in the sample except South Korea had not significantly
reduced their indebtedness by 1989.
Figure  1 contains plots of the  world risk-free  interest  rate  (LIBOR)  and of the
average interest rate paid by each country, obtained as the ratio between interest payments
in a given year and the  stock of debt outstanding at the end of the previous period.  To
arrive at a measure of the contractual interest rate, it is necessary  to correct for arrears in
interest payments.  Argentina had interest arrears in  1983-89, the Philippines in  1982-89,
and Brazil in 1987-48.  Also, Turkey had arrears in 1979-81, but due to data availability,
we could not correct interest payments in 1979-80 (see footnote 1).  The correction is done
by summing the change in the stock of interest arrears to actual interest payments.  Figure
1 reveals sizable cross-country  differences.  Three countries, Indonesia, Turkey,  and  the
Philippines, were charged an interest rate much lower and much less variable than LIBOR
for most of the sample period.  The spread tends to  become smaller after  1986.  At  the
opposite end of the spectrum, the graphs for Chile and especially Mexico show that  after
1975 the time-path  of the average interest rate is very close to  that  of LIBOR, with the
consequence  that both countries were severely hit by the sudden increase in world interest6
rates after the  second oil shock4.  Furthermore,  positive spreads over LIBOR  were paid
after '82.  Brazil and Venezuela were also substantially affected by the interest rates shock
of the turn of the decade.  Unlike the other Latin American countries, Argentina seems to
have partially avoided the increase in LIBOR between '78 and '81.  Finally, South Korea is
an intermediate  case.  Her implicit  average interest  rate  shows considerable covariance
with LIBOR, but stayed well below the peak rates reached after the  second oil shock and
the  worldwide recession that  followed.  In the  second half of the  '80s, South Korea took
advantage  of favorable external  circumstances to  make large  transfers to  her  creditors,
thereby substantially reducing her external debt.  Mexico or Chile also made substantial
positive net  transfers after  1983, but because of the  high interest rates and of the slower
rate of growth of their economy, their debt statistics have hardly improved.
This cursory inspection suggests that  interest rate shocks played a relevant  role in
triggering reschedulings in  Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela after 1982, as stressed by
most accounts of the debt crisis.  What is usually not underscored  is that  the impact of the
interest  shocks was considerably lower for the  three  countries  that  were successful in
avoiding reschedulings in  the  mid-eighties,  namely South Korea, and  especially Turkey
and Indonesia.  Two countries, Argentina and the Philippines, had to  reschedule even in
the absence of a sizable interest rate shock, suggesting that  policy mistakes alone should be
blamed for the  crisis.  It  should be noted that  both countries (especially the Philippines)
had a large amount of high-interest  rate short-term  debt at  the beginning of the  '80s, so
that  the  interest  rate  shock for these two countries was much larger than  what appears
from the data on long-term debt.  Also Venezuela had a lot of short-term  debt.
The next step is to explore possible reasons for the sharp cross-country  differences
4It is important  to point out that  the increase in the large nominal interest rates of '78-83
were also large real interest rates (see for instance R. Dornbusch. 1989).7
in  interest  rates.  In  Figure  2  the  average  interest  rate  is  broken  down  into  two
components, the interest rate charged by official  creditors (both bilateral and multilateral),
and the rate charged by private  creditors, which includes public, publicly guaranteed, and
private non-guaranteed  debt5. The fir~t observation is that  for all countries official debt
has been considerably cheaper, although this state  of affairs seems to be changing at  the
end  of the  '80s.  The interest  rate  on official debt  varies  between 5% and  Q-  for  all
countries,  and  Turkey  and  Indonesia  seem to  have  benefited from  a  more  favorable
treatment  by official creditors.
For  the Latin American countries, the behavior of the private interest rate  follows
the  average interest  rate quite  closely, consistent with the  fact that  the  share of official
debt is small (Table 2).  The same cannot be said for the  Asian countries:  S.Korea, for
instance,  was treated  by  her  private  creditors quite  similarly to  Brazil and  Venezuela,
suggesting that  it  was the  considerab!e size of official debt in  the  total  (Table  2)  that
allowed this  country  to  keep her  average interest  rate  low.  Similarly for Indonesia:
Without official debt, the interest rate paid by this country would have been quite close to
LIBOR, at  least  on average.  Indonesia had  also a  smaller share of variable-rate  debt
(Table 2), so that the time-path  of the interest rate on private debt is flatter  than LIBOR.
Fixed-rate  debt has allowed Indonesia to limit the interest rate shock of the early '80s, but
has meant  paying a  positive spread  (at  least  on  private  debt)  when LIBOR fell in  the
second half of the '80s.  As for Turkey, it is evident the reaction of private creditors to the
debt difficulties of '76 and '77, and the arrears that  followed. The spread between LIBOR
and the  interest  rate  on official debt has narrowed in  recent years, suggesting that  the
recent  increase in  official lending  to  the  Latin  American countries may  not  result  in
5Since  data on arrears to official creditors is confidential, the interest rates in Figure 2 are
not corrected for arrears, hence they reflect actual as opposed to contractual payments.8
substantial  interest  rate  relief.  The increase in  the  rate  of interest  applied by  official
creditors can probably be explained at least in part by the decline in the share of bilateral
lending for all countries in the sample.
Table 1 contains the shares of official  debt in the total.  In general, the share tends
to  decline until  the  mid-eighties,  as  private  lending  boomed,  and  then  it  gradually
increases, as international  institution  and bilateral donors became increasingly involved in
helping HICs.  However, the level of the exposure to official creditors varies considerably
across countries:  Latin American countries have generally a small exposure, except for
Chile in  the  early  '70s,  while  all  four  oI the  Asian countries  have  benefited from  a
substantial involvement of official lenders.  The dichotomy between Latin American and
Asian borrowers also appears  in  the  propensity to  borrow at  variable interest  rates,  as
shown by Table 2.  By the early  '80s, most of Latin American debt is at  variable rates,
while the four Asian countries keep most of their debt at fixed rates.
Finally, a few remarks on the currency composition of debt obligations in the period
1981-89.  For  all counitries, external  debt was mostly denominated in  US dollars.  The
Japanese yen has become increasingly important in the last few years, but its share stays
below 10iYo-15%  for Latin American countries and for Turkey.  S. Korea, Indonesia, and
the  Philippines had  between 25% and  3570 of yen-denominated  debt  by  1989.  Also,
Turkey had a sizable fraction of debt in D-marks  (11-17%).  Other currencies played a
minor role.
3. A Simple Model  of the Interes'  Rate, and the Empirical Specification.
In this section we present a model of the determinants of the interest  rate  in the
sovereign debt market  which allows us to  test  two hypotheses:  Whether official lenders9
have involved an  implicit  grant  element, and  ,liether  fixed-rate  debt  has  been
systematically  cheaper  than variable-rate debt.
Let ilt be the average  interest rate paid in year t by country  i (for the moment we
are not making any distinction between  official  debt and debt owed  to private creditors).
iit is a weighted  average  of the rate paid on loans at fixed  interest rates (i1f) and the rate
paid on loans at floating  rates (iof)
iit = hit i¶f + (1 -hit)  ifi
where  hit is the share  of debt at fixed  rates. Let rt be the reference  rate (LIBOR),  st be the
average  spread  over LIBOR,  and sfQ  be the spread  on floating  rate debt.  Then
(1)  sit = iit - rt = sQil  + hit (i-if - il)
The spread on floating-rate  debt should cover the  risk that  the loan will not be repaid in
full.  Hence,  it should be related to variables affecting the country's ability or willingness  to
pay, and  her bargaining power.  A large literature  has debated what induces sovereign
debtors to  repay  their  foreign debt  (J. Eaton  and  M.Gersovitz, 1981, J.  Bulow and  K.
Rogoff, 1989).  Rather  than  developing a  full-fledged model of  sovereign default,  and
derive a functional form of the spread from first  principles, we follow existing empirical
studies of the  sovereign debt market  (G.  Feder and  R. Just,  1977, S. Edwards, 1984, S.
Ozler,  forthcoming),  and  model  the  spread  as  a  linear  function  of  a  vector  of
creditworthiness variables
(2)  SQt  = 7 + fiYit + Wit10
where wit is an error term  with zero mean, fi is a  row vector of constants,  and yit  is a
column vector of creditworthiness variables.  To  arrive at  an  empirical specification of
equation (1), we need to model the unobservable difference between interest  rates on the
two types of debt contract.  Let xit = iif - ill.  If the default risk-premium is the same for
the two types of contract, xit should be
(3)  xit  Xt =  rt - rt
where r? is the expected risk-free  interest rate  at  the  time  the fixed-rate  contract  was
negotiated.  Since rl is not observable, we postulate that  expectations are formed based on
past realizations of rt
(4)  (1 + r2) = ao  + Rxi1  gk (I + rt-k)  +  et
were et is an error term with zero mean.  Then (3) becomes
(5)  xit  = xt = ao + al (1 +  rt)  + Ek"'l  Jk  (1 +  rt-k)  +  et
The average spread st can be written as follows
(6)  sit = ao hit + al [hit (1 + rt)] + Uzi 'k  [hit (1 + rt-k)] + 7 + fiYit + wit + hit et
To introduce official  debt, suppose that official  lenders charge the same interest rate
on floating-rate  and fixed-rate  debt as the private  creditors, except for a constant grant11
element g, which is the same for both types of loan, and it is the same for all countries
The interest on fixed-rate  debt owed to official  creditors is then
ioX  =if  -g
and similarly for floating-rate  debt.  The average spread paid by the country on her total
debt is
st =  7 + p yit +  ao  hit +  a, [hit (1 + rt)] + ED. 6k [hit(l  + rt.k)] + g Oit  + ??it
where oit is the share of official debt in the total, and i7it = wit + hit  et is the error term.
Since lags of LIBOR turned  out  not to  be significant, they  have been omitted  from the
preferred specification, and the equation estimated is
(7)  st=y  + fiyit  + ao hit + a, [hit (1 +  rt)] + g oit + i7it
If official debt does not  contain any grant element, g should not significantly differ from
zero.  To test  whether fixed-rate  debt has been significantly cheaper than debt at floating
rates over the sample, we compute
x =  &0  + &I  (1 + r)
where r is the mean of LIBOR in the  period under consideration, while ao and &I  are the
estimated values of the  coefficients. If x does not significantly differ from zero, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the two types of debt contract have resulted in the same burden12
of interest payments on average.
The vector yjt includes a list of variables that have shown to be significantly related
to HICs repayment pro8pects  in previous studies:  Real GNP per-Capita, the growth rate of
real GNP, debt-to-export  ratio, the share of imports in GNP, the rate of inflation (which
is a proxy for the ability of the  HIC government to keep the budget deficit under control).
LIBOR is also included.  Variables related to  foreign exchange reserves, which are often
used in  these studies, have been omitted  because it  is likely that  HICs do not truthfully
report their reserve holdings, especially during periods of repayment difficulties.
4.  Estimation Technique and Results.
Equation  (6) is estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series  data  for the
period 1973-1988. The covariance model (J. Kmenta, 1971) is used to account for country
and  time-specific  effects.  In  this  model,  each  country  and  each  time  period  are
characterized by  a  different intercept,  incorporated  in  the  regression through  dummy
variables.  Also, the time-series  for each country are tested for possible autocorrelation in
the residuals through a Durbin-Watson test, and no autocorrelation is detected 8.
Notice that  the error term in equation (7) is heteroskedastic by construction.  To
deal with heteroskedasticity two methods are used.  First,  the  model is estimated  using
OLS, and then White's consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix (H. White,
1980) are computed.  White  shows that  the  degree to  which these asymptotic  standard
errors  differ from the  usual ones indicates the  severity of  the  heteroskedasticity.  The
results in Table 4 indicate that these differences  are generally small, and do not change the
6The D-W  statistic falls either in the no-autocorrelation  or in the ambiguous region for all
time-series.13
significance levels of the  coefficients.  White  (1980) also mentions  that  if  the  correct
structure of the error variance is known, taking it into account by making the appropriate
transformations  in  the  equation  to  be  estimated  would improve  the  efficiency of  the
estimators in small samples.  Consequently, a weighted OLS specification  is also estimated.
This is obtained as follows. First, we assume that  the two components of the error term  et
and wt are both normally distributed with mean zero and variance al and  2r respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that  cov (et,  wt)  0 for al  t.  Then a proper transformation is to
divide all observations by (s 2  + he s2)O.5,  where the 82 are the estimated variances of the
two components of the error term.  These are obtained by regressing the squared residuals
from the  unweighted regression on hi.  The transformed model is then  estimated  using
OLS.  As shown in Table 4, the results of the estimation remain basically -.nchanged if the
weighted model is used, confirming that heteroskedasticity is not severe.
The model has also been tested for the possibility of a structural  shift around 1982,
when several countries started rescheduling their debt, and spreads began to be negotiated
in the  rescheduling agreements.  A Chow test  shows that  the hypothesis of no structural
shifts cannot be rejected at 5% confidence  level.  In any case, equation (6) has also been
estimated  for the  two subperiods 1973-81 and 1982--88  separately.  The creditworthiness
variables become  less significant in the second subperiod, but all the other results hold7.
Table 4 presents the  estimation results.  First  of all, among the  creditworthiness
variables, the share of imports in GNP has a significant and positive effect on the average
spread:  Countries that  are more dependent on imports  are more vulnerable to  terms  of
trade or exchange rate shocks, and therefore they are more likely to default.  Also, larger
levels and growth rates of GNP per-capita  make countries more creditworthy.  The rate of
7Also, introducing a dummy variable for Turkey in 1979-80, to control for interest  arrears
of unknown size, does not change the results.14
inflation, the  level of GNP  per-capita,  and  LIBOR  are not  significant.  Also, perhaps
surprisingly,  the coefficient  of the debt-to-export ratio is not significant,  although it is of
the expected  sipn.
At the bottom of the Table, the estimated difference  between  the interest rate on
fixed-rate debt and on floating-rate debt is presented. x is not significantly  different  from
zero,  indicating that creditors  have obtained  on average  the same return on the two types
of loan.  However,  this does not mean that  borrowing  countries should be indifferent
between  the two types of contract:  Floating and fixed-rate debt give rise to a different
profile  of debt service  over time and over states of nature, and a risk-averse  country  would
prefer the contract that provides better "insurance"  against fluctuations  in the marginal
utility of consumption  (see E. Detragiache,  1992).
The coefficient  of the  share of  official debt is  negative and significant, hence
countries  that were relatively  more exposed  towards  official  creditors  benefited  from lower
interest rates.  The coefficient  is around  - 0.7%,  indicating  that a difference  in the share of
official  debt of 10 percentage  points leads to a reduction in the average  interest rate of
about 70 basis points. Table 1 shows  that cross-country differences  in the share of official
debt can be as  large as  50%-60% of total indebtedness, suggesting  that  this  source
accounts  for a sizable  portion of the cross-country  variability  in interest rates.  Countries
with a large exposure  to official  creditors  - such as Turkey, Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and
South Korea - obtained a significant  subsidy  in the form of below-market  interest rates.
This element also accounts for some of the  time-series variation in  the spread:  For
instance, Chile's negative spread in the early '70s quickly changes  sign as the share of
official  debt drops  from almost  50%  to around 10%  in the '80s.
It is important to point out that the grant element  implicit in official  loans cannot
simply be evaluated by looking  at the difference  between  the interest rate on private debt15
and on official debt, documented in Figure 2.  Official loans may be cheaper because of an
implicit grant element but also because official creditors expect debtor countries to default
on debt  owed to  private  creditors before they default  on official debt.  In other  wants,
official  creditors consider themselves de facto senior 8. However, in an equilibrium, for any
given level of debt,  the  average interest  rate  does not  depend on  the  break-down  into
senior and junior claims:  a country with more (low-interest  rate) senior debt must pay a
larger rate on junior debt.  Hence, the negative and significant coefficient of the share of
official debt in the regression explaining the average interest rate must capture exclusively
the subsidy element implicit in official  loans 9.
5.  Differences  in the Currency  Composition  of Debt.
The results presented so far do not take into account that  debt was denominated in
different currencies.  If currency, composition shows considerable variation  both  across
countries and over time, it  may explain some of the  variation in  average interest  rates.
Moreover, it may be that  differences in interest rates do not reflect differences  in the real
burden of debt service:  Consider two countries, one of which is indebted mostly in US
dollars, while the  other  is  indebted  mostly in  yen.  Suppose that  in  the  period under
consideration inflation in Japan is on average lower than in the U.S., and the dollar tends
to  depreciate relative  to  the  yen.  Then  nominal interest  rates  on dollar-denominated
assets will be higher on average than  interest rates on yen-denominated  assets, although
8The  alleged seniority of official  creditors is often mentioned in the policy debate, and it has
recently been questioned by M. Dooley (1990).
gIt  can  be  argued  that  official loans,  since  they  sometimes contain  an  element  of
conditionality, improve the  chances that  the  receipient country will follow wise policies,
and therefore increase creditworthiness.  However, the creditworthiness variables included
in the regression  should control for the effects  of conditionality.16
real interest rates are the same. Consequently,  the country  indebted  in dollars pays higher
interest rates on her debt, but this is compensated  by a lower real cost of repaying the
principal.  It  should be noted that  high nominal interest rates, although they may not
increase  the real burden of debt service,  may still create payment difficulties,  as observed
by R. Dornbusch  (1989):  The maturity of the debt is effectively  shortened, causing
potential liquidity  problems. Also,  since banks are generally  more reluctant to reschedule
interest than principal, countries  more exposed  in high-inflation currencies  are likely to
find  it harder to renegotiate  their debt.
In this section, we reformulate  the model of section 3 to take into account the
different  currency  composition  of external debt, and we arrive to an empirical  specification
that allows essentially  the same hypothesis  testing performed  in section 4.  Since data
about currency  composition  is available  only from 1981,  these second  set of result is based
on a much smaller sample.  The regression analysis also allows us to construct estimates of
the average interest rate that  each country paid on debt denominated  in a particular
currency.  Using these estimates, we can evaluate whether the  observed variation in
interest rates was  actually due to differences  in currency  composition  or not.
The country's debt is denominated  in n currencies. Currency  1 is USS. et,k is the
exchange rate between US$ and currency k at t.  Dropping the subscript that  identifies the
country,  the average  interest rate on currency  k-denominated  debt is
it,k  ,  It,k
Dt-1,k
where It,k are total interest payments at t on debt denominated in currency k, and Dt l,k is
the stock of currency-k  debt outstanding at  the end of period t-1.  The average interest
rate on total debt converted in dollars is17
it  ED.,=et ,k It,k  -t  , k  Dt,k  it  k =  ES,  ft,k  it,k
Dt-  . Dt-I
where ft,k =  et,  Dt-l,k  ft,k is observable.  Notice, however, that  in our data  set the
D  t  -1
share  of  currency-k  debt  in  the  total  is  not  ft.,.  but  et-1,k  Dt-l,k  ,  because
end-of-the-year  debt is converted at the exchange rate of t-1.  So to compute ft from the
data we must multiply the shares by etL-  k  Define also
ft  =  Et31 ft,k
Let rt,k  denote the risk-free rate on currency k.  The average spread on currency k debt is
then
St,k  =  it,k  - rt,k
The average spread over LIBOR is then
(8)  St =  it - rt,I  =a  i1  ft.k St,k - [R,1  ft,  rt,k  - rt,iI
(rt,i  is  LIBOR).  The term  in  parenthesis is observable.  Define the  following modified
spread
-t  =  1  fk  St,k =  St +  EL1 ft,k  (rt,k  - rt,i)18
From previous analysis (section 3), the average spread on debt denominated in currency k
can be modeled as
fxC  fl
(9)  St,k =  RPt,k  +  ht,k  (it), kc  it,k)  +  gk Ot,k
where RPt,k is  the  default-risk  premium, and  gk is  the  grant  element associated with
official loans, which is potentially currency-specific.  To arrive to a testable equation, we
assume that  the default risk-premium is equal for all currencies
RPt,k  =  RPt  =  7+  fyt+  Wt
Also, we need to assume that the parameters in the expression that  captures the difference
between the  interest  rate on fixed-rate  loans an on floating-rate  loans are not currency
specific
.fx  i  fl
Substituting (9) and (10) into (8)
(11)  St =  7 ft +  (P Yt) ft +  aO  Et-l (ft,k ht,k) +  at Et=1  (ft,k ht,k rt,k)  +
E:-1 gk (ft,k Ot,k) +  Wt,k
where the error term Wt,k iS
Wt,k =  ft wt  + Ei=s ft,k  ht,k  ft,k19
The parameters to  be estimated  are 7, the  vector fi, uo, a1, and gl, g92a,,  gn.  Hypothesis
testing is similau to that of section 4, namely
Ho:  =O,gk  =Oforallk,xk  ao+  &kI  Oforallk.
with  the same interpretation  as before.  We can also test  whether the  size of the grant
element and  the  difference between floating and fixed-rate  debt  vary  according to  the
currency of denomination.
Table  5  presents  the  results.  The  coefficient estimates of  the  creditworthiness
variables are not significant at the five percent level.  Since the value of the F statistic and
of the adjusted R2 improve without these variables, they are excluded from the preferred
specification.  Since the  sample period covers only 1981-89 this result  is not surprising.
The summary statistics  at  the  bottom  of Table  5 indicate  the  fit  of the  model.  The
statistical fit is better for the weighted specification'0.
The grant  element associated with  official debt  continues to  be significant when
differences in  currency  composition are  taken  into  account.  The  g  coefficients are
collectively different from zero at one percent significance  level.  However, the hypothesis
that  they  are  all  equal is rejected.  The  differences are  apparent  from the  individual
coefficients  in Table 5.  Sterling-denominated official  loans seem to have the largest grant
element, while D-mark  have the smallest (it  is not significantly different from zero).  A
loThe estimation  of  the  weighted model differs from that  of equation  (7)  only in  the
estimation of the weights.  Squared residduals from the unweighted model are regressed on
f? and Ei.,(ft,k  ht,k) 2 to obtain the variance estimates.  Then, all observations are divided
by  [fw s2  +  E.ll(ft,k  ht,k)2 sf]O5,  where  the  s2  are  the  estimated  variances.  The
transformed model, which now has a constant error term, is estimated using OLS.20
large share of official  debt in French francs appears to have had an adverse  effect on the
average spread  However,  the coefficients  of sterling, French and Swiss franc should be
evaluated  with caution, since the share of official  debt denominated  in these currencies  is
generally  negligible,  and the results we observe  may be due to rare individual  occurrences.
To  sum  up,  there  is  a  significant grant  element associated with  official debt,  and  its
magnitude  is different  according  to the currency  of denomination.
The estimated difference between the interest rate on fixed-rate  debt and floating-
rate debt for the different currencies  is reported at the bottom of Table 5.  Again, the
results vary significantly according to the currency of denomination. For US dollar, French
franc  and  sterling,  xk is  not  significantly different from zero, indicating  that  creditors
obtained the same return on floating and fixed-rate  debt on average.  However, this is not
true for D-mark,  Swiss franc and yen.  For these currencies, fixed-rate  debt appeared to
have been significantly more expensive than floating-rate debt, suggesting that  perhaps the
market  has consistently overeitimated  actual interest rates on these three currencies.  It
may not be a coincidence that  these currencies are all from low-inflation countries, but we
have no interpretation  to offer for why this may be the case.
To sum up, controlling for the currency composition of debt does not substantially
alter the results in section 4.  Also, using the parameters estimated above it is possible to
construct the average interest rate  that  countries would bave paid in a given year, if they
had chosen the same currency composition. If sizable cross-country differences also appear
in this measure, we must conclude that factors other than a different currency composition
have mattered,  and that  observed differences  in  nominal interest rates have resulted in  a
different real burden of debt service.  Let  ft,k  be the  average share of currency k in the
sample at time t.  11,k is the estimated average interest rate on currency k debt for country
i in year t.  Then21
2t  =  )l  ?t,k  ik
is  the  estimated  average  interest  rate  paid  by  country  i  in  year  t,  if  the  currency
composition of debt  had  been the  sample average for that  year.  Figure  3 shows this
standardized  interest  rates,  plotted  against  LIBOR.  Clearly,  the  large  differences
documented in  Figure  1 persist.  In  particular,  Indonesia, Turkey,  and  the  Philippines
would have benefited of significantly lower rates than the Latin American countries, even
when the effects of a different currency composition of debt are eliminated.
5.  Conclusions.
A  correct  understanding  of  the  causes  and  circumstances  that  led  to  the
international  debt crisis of the  '80s is important  both because it  may help prevent other
such crises, and  because of the  major  role that  multilateral  institutions  have recently
acquired in promoting and financing debt relief initiatives:  This role raises the question of
whether debt relief rewards countries that  do not deserve international aid, and whether it
will just encourage  future default behavior.
The evidence presented in  this  paper  suggests that  HICs have received different
treatment  from their  creditors in terms  of the  interest rate  that  they paid.  Differential
treatment  has resulted in average interest rates well below market rates in several cases.
In  particular,  the  three  large  debtor  countries  which did  not  reschedule in  the  '80s
(Indonesia, Turkey,  and South Korea) were able to  pay  average interest  rates  markedly
below  those paid by Mexico, Chile, and Brazil.  Lower  interest rates were in part the result
of a favorable assessment of default risk, which could be attributed  to  prudent policies in22
the borrowing country.  Large growth rates of GNP per-capita  and low ratios of imports to
GNP are associated with  lower spreads.  However, a large share of official debt has also
meant  significantly lower sipreads  for the  countries in the  sample.  This  component can
explain differences in  the average interest rate of 3-4  percentage points, arising from the
substantial  grant  element implicit in  official loans.  Greater  access to  official loans has
allowed countries like Indonesia, Turkey,  the  Philippines, and South Korea to limit  the
burden of debt servicing.  Recently, international  institutions  and bilateral  donors have
subsidized debt restructuring in  Latin American countries, such as Medico.  This flow of
aid,  motivated  by the  desire of donors to  reward and support  policy reform, is reducing
differences  in access to official creditors among the countries in the sample.
During the '70s and '80s HICs have also significantly differed as to the share of debt
at floating interest rates in the total.  It has often been suggested that  floating-rate  debt
has hurt  indebted  countries, and  recent  debt  reduction  agreements show a tendency  to
reverting to fixed-rate  instruments.  Our results show that  the interest  rates on the two
types of loan have not  significantly differed on average, so that  in  spite of the extremely
high nominal interest rates in the early '80s it does not seem that fixed-rate  debt allowed
countries  to  reduce  their  average interest  burden  over  the  sample.  It  may  be  true,
however, that  indexation to LIBOR forced countries to make especially large transfers in
periods it which it was particularly burdensome to do so.
Finally,  for  the  years  1980-1989 it  was possible  to  control  for  the  effects of
differences  in currency composition on the average interest rate.  The results are essentially
unchanged, although it appears that for 'strong' currencies (yen, Swiss franc, and D-mark)
fixed-rate  debt has been more expensive than floating-rate  debt on average.  Also, the size
of the grant element associated with official debt appears to be significantly affected by the
currency of denomination.  Finally,  we find that  if countries  had  all  chosen the  same23
currency composition  of debt, large cross-country differences  in  average interest rates
would  have  persisted.
I~~~~~~  . .24
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TABLE 1.  Share of Official  Debt in Total Debt, 1973-89
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Indonesia  S.Korea
1973  14.3  20.9  48.7  61.6  45.2
1974  16.2  17.8  46.4  56.2  43.6
1975  17.1  17.1  48.7  48.3  42.3
1976  15.4  15.6  46.7  46.8  43.8
1977  15.3  14.3  41.9  48.7  42.8
1978  16.8  12.5  31.0  51.8  39.4
1979  13.3  12.0  20.9  51.8  35.6
1980  11.3  12.2  14.6  52.6  34.7
1981  8.4  11.8  10.1  51.8  33.6
1982  7.2  11.6  8.5  51.1  34.5
1983  7.8  12.4  8.7  47.8  34.0
1984  7.1  13.9  8.7  46.9  31.3
1985  11.5  17.0  11.9  49.5  29.0
1986  13.2  20.8  16.1  51.0  30.6
1987  17.1  23.8  21.7  55.0  38.1
1988  17.7  24.3  26.9  58.3  38.1
1989  18.6  26.9  32.9  60.9  37.2
Meico  Philippines  Turkey  Venezuela
1973  29.4  32.2  90.4  21.9
1974  25.7  31.7  89.1  23.3
1975  22.5  31.9  89.8  37.0
1976  20.9  28.3  84.8  16.1
1977  17.7  28.6  73.9  9.4
1978  17.8  30.5  75.6  5.8
1979  16.8  32.0  58.6  3.8
1980  10.9  29.8  61.8  4.1
1981  10.1  32.7  64.0  3.6
1982  11.7  31.4  63.9  3.1
1983  8.2  35.1  62.7  2.4
1984  8.1  38.2  60.1  1.7
1985  10.0  41.1  61.4  1.5
1986  13.3  37.8  60.0  0.1
1987  15.9  41.2  57.6  1.3
1988  18.1  44.8  54.8  1.5
1989  20.9  52.9  46.3  3.2
Source: World Debt Tables, World  Bank, various years.26
Table 2. Share of Variable-Rate  Debt on Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt, 1973-89.
Argentina  Brazil  ChUe  Indonesia  S.Korea
1973  6.8  35.9  6.8  2.3  8.6
1974  17.5  44.6  11.0  1.6  14.0
1975  17.5  52.1  11.0  15.0  16.7
1976  36.7  55.6  14.0  17.5  17.7
1977  39.4  54.7  17.5  16.4  17.9
1978  38.2  56.7  32.7  13.5  26.1
1979  48.0  59.5  47.1  13.4  27.2
1980  (  57.2  61.3  51.2  16.2  35.2
1981  59.5  67.3  55.8  17.8  39.0
1982  42.9  69.7  66.1  20.1  42.3
1983  77.1  72.2  71.3  22.8  47.1
1984  78.4  75.9  80.5  24.2  49.2
1985  82.9  72.1  82.3  22.1  43.6
1986  83.2  70.1  80.7  24.3  30.6
1.987  84.1  67.5  79.1  26.2  30.5
1988  83.0  73.4  80.1  35.5  45.8
1989  85.6  72.9  76.4  38.0  45.7
Mexico  Philippines  Turkey  Venezuela
1973  40.1  7.4  0.5  22.9
1974  49.0  17.1  1.0  20.7
1975  51.1  20.0  0.8  18.3
1976  50.3  19.7  3.0  39.0
1977  53.3  21.2  9.3  60.2
1978  59.6  21.8  8.8  63.4
1979  69.8  25.1  31.5  76.7
1980  71.2  29.4  24.0  78.5
1981  75.0  30.6  23.4  79.9
1982  76.3  36.1  24.0  83.6
1983  82.5  35.5  24.3  81.2
1984  83.8  37.1  27.5  88.1
1985  81.4  36.4  27.3  86.0
1986  79.4  51.0  29.4  89.7
1987  79.1  48.2  31.8  89.1
1988  80.4  45.5  35.2  88.9
1989  80.3  44.4  32.1  89.0
Source:  World Debt Tables, World Bank, various years.TABLE  3. Sample  Means  for Each  Country,  1973-1989.
IiIiiZIIIIGNPPC  GGNPPC  IMPGNP  |_EDTEXP  INFL
ARGENTINA  1936.52  .049  .101  358.81  4.16
(341.9)  (.11)  (.04)  (179.1)  (7.7)
BRAZIL  1693.11  .096  .089  323.38  2.03
(478.2)  (.11)  (.02)  (75.1)  (3.1)
CHILE  1528.05  .042  .270  227.91  1.32
(487.3)  (.17)  (.07)  (87.1)  (1.9)
INDONESIA  423.29  .112  .227  165.92  .16
(159.1)  (.14)  (.03)  (57.3)  (.12)
S. KOREA  1845.82  .167  .359  104.28  .13
(1119.2)  (.08)  (.03)  (28.4)  (.09)
MEXICO  1881.00  .063  .120  294.63  .49
(549.7)  (.14)  (.03)  (61.7)  (.38)
PHILIPPINES  561.41  .077  .237  222.99  .14
(161.2)  (.11)  (.04)  (86.5)  (.11)
TURKEY  1121.50  .079  .172  225.34  .42
(266.5)  (.13)  (.06)  (86.3)  (.22)
VENEZUELA  3407.40  .044  .225  153.40  .20
(985.4)  (.14)  (.06)  (92.6)  (.23)
Standard  errors  are  reported  in parantheses.  Variable  definitions  and  sources
are  provided  in the  appendix.TBLLE  4.  OLS  Regressions  Explaining  Average  Spread.
::  :"-  Unw*ightd  Weighted
RuSB  stdI  Whit's.  coeff.  std.
variable..  eat.-.  error  utd.  er.  eat.  error
(1+LIB)  .027  .014  .014  -. 023  .014
(1+LXB)h  -.963**  .166  .144  -. 974**  .166
GGNPPC  .026*  .012  .010  .026*  .011
GNPPC  -2x10  6 2x106 2x10  6 *3x10 6**  2x106
IMPGNP  .098**  .035  .034  .096**  .035
EDTEXP  9x10 6 lx10  5 lx10  5 3x10 6 lx10  5
INFL  -9x10  5 4x10 4 3x10' 4 -1.7x10 4 4x10  4
h  1.071**  .182  .157  1.081**  .182
o  -.075**  .017  .015  -. 071**  .016
calc.  x  .0136  .014  .015  .012  .015
j==  - .--
Summary  Statistics
I of obs.  151  151
R2 _  .89  .91
F  32.12**  36.46**
Dependent  variable  is  average  spread  (rd-lib).  Variable  sources  and  definitions
are  given in the appendix.  Not reported  above are  coefficients  of  country  and
year  dummy  variables.  Weighted  specification  weights  observations  by (sw2+se 2h2)  5.
**,  *  indicate  coefficlent  estimates  that  differ  significantly  from  zero  at 1  and
5 percents  respectively.TABLE ..  OLS Regressions Explaining Average Spread, Controlling For Currency
Composition of Debt
|"'w.'..'.g.."  Unweighted  Weighted
b  |_  e  _  _  ~  ~  ______  _____  _  Weig=e
[  co¢{!*  . t;*.from  cl  ff..  ¢t  |std.  White,,  coeff  atd.
0eq.  (10)  :  t|  error  std,  sr.  est.  error
|  cfO  l  .165**  .046  .038  .152**  .040
-1.530**  .309  .290  _1.530**  .225
gus  -.104**  .054  .042  -.066  .047
gOM  -.137  .249  .159  .047  .207
gFF  1.690**  .588  .598  1.500**  .601
STLGi.  2.830**  1.210  1.030  -3.290**  1.160
9SWF  §  -.6390  .523  .392  -.908*  .438
9YEN  -.122*  .078  .057  -.114  .078
cal.  .009  .033  .031  -. 004  .035
ca.  DM  .066*  .036  .032  .053*  .032
calc.  F  5  -.030  .035  .034  -.043  .030
calc.  - TL  .011  .032  .030  -.025  .031
calc.  S  WF  .083**  .037  .032  .070*  .033
cal.  x  YE  .E73*  .036  .032  .060k  .032
calc_._  .073  .036.,..  .
Summary  Statistics  |
t  of obs.  80  75
R2 .89  .94
po  20.60**  35.30**
Dependent variable is the average spread correcting  for currency composition.
Not reported above  are coefficients of country and year dummy  variables. Weighted
specification  weightc  observations  by  (ft 25W2+Enk.1(ft,kht,k) 2se,k 2) 5. **  *1  1
indicate coefficient estimates that differ significantly from zero at 1, S, and
10 percents respectively.Figr  1. Average  Interest Rate for Selected  HICs and LIBOR, 1973-89.
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Variable  Defintions and Sources.
GNPPC:  GNP  per-capita in constant  S.
GGNPPC:  Percentage change in GNPPC.
IHPGNP:  ratio  of imports  to  GNP.
EDTEXPt  ratio of total external debt to exports.
INFL:  rate of inflation as given by percentage change in GDP
deflator.
LID:  6-month LIBOR rate.
Rs  interest rate charged on public debt by private creditors.
RP:  interest rate charged on private non-guaraneed debt by private
creditors.
OFR:  interest rate charged on official debt by official creditors.
RD:_  ~  weighted-average  of the above  three interest  rates.
h:  ratio of fixed rate loans to total loans.
o:  ratio of official debt to total debt.
SPRRD:  average spread, rd-lib.
All variables are available annually  for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia,
South Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuella.  LIBOR and euromarket
rates on other currencies  (DM, FF, STLG, SWF, YEN), as well as exchange rates
(period  averages) are  obtained from  the International Financial Statistics of  the
International Monetary Fund.  Currency composition of  debt and  all other data are
from the World Bank's Debt Reoortina System.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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